On values of repeated games with signals by Gimbert, Hugo et al.
ar
X
iv
:1
40
6.
42
48
v2
  [
ma
th.
OC
]  
7 J
an
 20
16
The Annals of Applied Probability
2016, Vol. 26, No. 1, 402–424
DOI: 10.1214/14-AAP1095
c© Institute of Mathematical Statistics, 2016
ON VALUES OF REPEATED GAMES WITH SIGNALS
By Hugo Gimbert∗,1, Je´roˆme Renault†,2, Sylvain Sorin‡,3,
Xavier Venel§,2,4 and Wies law Zielonka¶
Labri∗, GREMAQ, Universite´ Toulouse 1 Capitole†, Sorbonne Universite´s‡,
Universite´ Paris Diderot§ and Universite´ Paris 1 Panthe´on-Sorbonne¶
We study the existence of different notions of value in two-person
zero-sum repeated games where the state evolves and players receive
signals. We provide some examples showing that the limsup value
(and the uniform value) may not exist in general. Then we show the
existence of the value for any Borel payoff function if the players ob-
serve a public signal including the actions played. We also prove two
other positive results without assumptions on the signaling structure:
the existence of the sup value in any game and the existence of the
uniform value in recursive games with nonnegative payoffs.
1. Introduction. The aim of this article is to study two-player zero-sum
general repeated games with signals (sometimes called “stochastic games
with partial observation”). At each stage, each player chooses some action
in a finite set. This generates a stage reward then a new state and new
signals are randomly chosen through a transition probability depending on
the current state and actions, and with finite support. Shapley [26] studied
the special case of standard stochastic games where the players observe,
at each stage, the current state and the past actions. There are several
ways to analyze these games. We will distinguish two approaches: Borelian
evaluation and uniform value.
In this article, we will mainly use a point of view coming from the lit-
erature on determinacy of multistage games (Gale and Stewart [3]). One
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defines a function, called evaluation, on the set of plays (infinite histories)
and then studies the existence of a value in the normal form game where
the payoff is given by the expectation of the evaluation, with respect to the
probability induced by the strategies of the players. Several evaluations will
be considered.
In the initial model of Gale and Stewart [3] of two-person zero-sum multi-
stage game with perfect information, there is no state variable. The players
choose, one after the other, an action from a finite set and both observe
the previous choices. Given a subset A of the set of plays (in this frame-
work: infinite sequences of actions), player 1 wins if and only if the actual
play belongs to the set A: the payoff function is the indicator function of A.
Gale and Stewart proved that the game is determined: either player 1 has
a winning strategy or player 2 has a winning strategy, in the case where A
is open or closed with respect to the product topology. This result was then
extended to more and more general classes of sets until Martin [15] proved
the determinacy for every Borel set. When A is an arbitrary subset of plays,
Gale and Stewart [3] showed that the game may be not determined.
In 1969, Blackwell [1] studied the case (still without state variable) where
the players play simultaneously and are told their choices. Due to the lag
of information, the determinacy problem is not well defined. Instead, one
investigates the probability that the play belongs to some subset A. When
A is a Gδ-set, a countable intersection of open sets, Blackwell proved that
there exists a real number v, the value of the game, such that for each ε > 0,
player 1 can ensure that the probability of the event: “the play is in A” is
greater than v− ε, whereas player 2 can ensure that it is less than v+ ε.
The extension of this result to Shapley’s model (i.e., with a state variable)
was done by Maitra and Sudderth. They focus on the specific evaluation
where the payoff is the largest stage reward obtained infinitely often. They
prove the existence of a value, called limsup value, in the countable frame-
work [10], in the Borelian framework [11] and in a finitely additive setting
[12]. In the first two cases, they assume some finiteness of the action set (for
one of the players). Their result especially applies to finite stochastic games
where the global payoff is the limsup of the mean expected payoff.
Blackwell’s existence result was generalized by Martin [16] to any Borel-
measurable evaluation, whereas Maitra and Sudderth [13] extended it further
to stochastic games in the finitely additive setting. In all these results, the
players observe the past actions and the current state.
Another notion used in the study of stochastic games (where a play gen-
erates a sequence of rewards) is the uniform value where some uniformity
condition is required. Basically, one looks at the largest amount that can
be obtained by a given strategy for a family of evaluations (corresponding
to longer and longer games). There are examples where the uniform value
does not exist: Lehrer and Sorin [9] describe such a game with a countable
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set of states and only one player, having a finite action set. On the other
hand, Rosenberg, Solan and Vieille [23] proved the existence of the uniform
value in partial observation Markov Decision Processes (one player) when
the set of states and the set of actions are finite. This result was extended
by Renault [21] to general action space.
The case of stochastic games with standard signaling, that is, where
the players observes the state and the actions played has been treated by
Mertens and Neyman [18]. They proved the existence of a uniform value for
games with a finite set of states and finite sets of actions. In fact, their proof
also shows the existence of a value for the limsup of the mean payoff, as
studied in Maitra and Sudderth and that both values are equal.
The aim of this paper is to provide new existence results when the players
are observing only signals on state and actions. In Section 2, we define the
model and present several specific Borel evaluations. We then prove the ex-
istence of a value in games where the evaluation of a play is the largest stage
reward obtained along it, called sup evaluation and study several examples
where the limsup value does not exist.
Section 3 is the core of this paper. We focus on the case of symmet-
ric signaling structure: multistage games where both players have the same
information at each stage, and prove that a value exists for any Borel eval-
uation. For the proof, we introduce an auxiliary game where the players
observe the state and the actions played and we apply the generalization
of Martin’s result to standard stochastic games. Finally, in Section 4, we
introduce formally the notion of uniform value and prove its existence in
recursive games with nonnegative payoffs.
2. Repeated game with signals and Borel evaluation. Given a set X , we
denote by ∆f (X) the set of probabilities with finite support on X . For any
element x ∈X , δx stands for the Dirac measure concentrated on x.
2.1. Model. A repeated game form with signals Γ = (X,I,J,C,D,π, q)
is defined by a set of states X , two finite sets of actions I and J , two
sets of signals C and D, an initial distribution π ∈∆f (X × C ×D) and a
transition function q from X × I × J to ∆f (X ×C ×D). A repeated game
with signals (Γ, g) is a pair of a repeated game form and a reward function
g from X × I × J to [0,1].
This corresponds to the general model of repeated game introduced in
Mertens, Sorin and Zamir [19].
The game is played as follows. First, a triple (x1, c1, d1) is drawn according
to the probability π. The initial state is x1, player 1 learns c1 whereas player 2
learns d1. Then, independently, player 1 chooses an action i1 in I and player 2
chooses an action j1 in J . A new triple (x2, c2, d2) is drawn according to the
probability distribution q(x1, i1, j1), the new state is x2, player 1 learns c2,
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player 2 learns d2 and so on. At each stage n players choose actions in and
jn and a triple (cn+1, dn+1, xn+1) is drawn according to q(xn, in, jn), where
xn is the current state, inducing the signals received by the players and the
state at the next stage.
For each n≥ 1, we denote by Hn = (X ×C×D× I × J)
n−1×X ×C×D
the set of finite histories of length n, by H1n = (C × I)
n−1 × C the set of
histories of length n for player 1 and by H2n = (D × J)
n−1 ×D the set of
histories of length n for player 2. Let H =
⋃
n≥1Hn.
Assuming perfect recall, a behavioral strategy for player 1 is a sequence
σ = (σn)n≥1, where σn, the strategy at stage n, is a mapping from H
1
n to
∆(I), with the interpretation that σn(h) is the lottery on actions used by
player 1 after h ∈H1n. In particular, the strategy σ1 at stage 1 is simply a
mapping from C to ∆(I) giving the law of the first action played by player
1 as a function of his initial signal. Similarly, a behavorial strategy for player
2 is a sequence τ = (τn)n≥1, where τn is a mapping from H
2
n to ∆(J). We
denote by Σ and T the sets of behavioral strategies of player 1 and player
2, respectively.
If for every n≥ 1 and h ∈H1n, σn(h) is a Dirac measure then the strategy
is pure. A mixed strategy is a distribution over pure strategies.
Note that since the initial distribution π and the transition q have finite
support and the sets of actions are finite, there exists a finite subsetH0n ⊂Hn
such that for all strategies (σ, τ) the set of histories that are reached at stage
n with a positive probability is included in H0n.
Hence, no additional measurability assumptions on the strategies are
needed. It is standard that a pair of strategies (σ, τ) induces a probabil-
ity Pσ,τ on the set of plays H∞ = (X × C × D × I × J)
∞ endowed with
the σ-algebra H∞ generated by the cylinders above the elements of H . We
denote by Eσ,τ the corresponding expectation.
Historically, the first models of repeated games assumed that both cn+1
and dn+1 determine (in, jn) (standard signalling on the moves also called
“full monitoring”).
A stochastic game corresponds to the case where in addition the state is
known: both cn+1 and dn+1 contain xn+1.
A game with incomplete information corresponds to the case where in
addition the state is fixed: x1 = xn,∀n, but not necessarily known by the
players.
Several extensions have been proposed and studied; see, for example, Ney-
man and Sorin [20] in particular Chapters 3, 21, 25, 28.
It has been noticed since Kohlberg and Zamir [7] that games with in-
complete information, when the information is symmetric: cn+1 = dn+1 and
contains (in, jn), could be analyzed by introducing an auxiliary stochas-
tic game. However, the state variable in this auxiliary stochastic game is
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no longer xn ∈X but the (common) conditional probability on X given the
signals, that can be computed by the players: namely the law of xn in ∆(X).
Since then, this approach has been extended; see, for example, Sorin [29],
Ghosh et al. [5] and the analysis in the current article shows that general
repeated games with symmetric information are the natural extension of
standard stochastic games.
2.2. Borel evaluation and results. We now describe several ways to eval-
uate each play and the corresponding concepts. We follow the multistage
game determinacy literature and define an evaluation function f on infinite
plays. Then we study the existence of the value of the normal form game
(Σ,T , f). We will consider especially four evaluations: the general Borel
evaluation, the sup evaluation, the limsup evaluation and the limsup-mean
evaluation.
A Borel evaluation is a H∞-measurable function from the set of plays H∞
to [0,1].
Definition 1. Given an evaluation f , the game Γ has a value if
sup
σ
inf
τ
Eσ,τ (f) = inf
τ
sup
σ
Eσ,τ (f).
This real number is called the value and denoted by v(f).
Given a repeated game (Γ, g), we will study several specific evaluations
defined through the stage payoff function g.
2.2.1. Borel evaluation: sup evaluation. The first evaluation is the supre-
mum evaluation where a play is evaluated by the largest payoff obtained
along it.
Definition 2. γs is the sup evaluation defined by
∀h ∈H∞, γ
s(h) = sup
n≥1
g(xn, in, jn).
In (Σ,T , γs), the maxmin, the minmax, and the value (called the sup value
if it exists) are, respectively, denoted by vs, vs and vs.
The specificity of this evaluation is that for every n ≥ 1, the maximal
stage payoff obtained before n is a lower bound of the evaluation on the
current play. We prove that the sup value always exists.
Theorem 3. A repeated game (Γ, g) with the sup evaluation has a value
vs.
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For the proof, we use the following result. We call strategic evaluation
a function F from Σ× τ to [0,1]. It is clear that an evaluation f induces
naturally a strategic evaluation by F (σ, τ) = Eσ,τ (f).
Proposition 4. Let (Fn)n≥1 be an increasing sequence of strategic eval-
uations from Σ× τ to [0,1] that converges to some function F . Assume that:
• Σ and τ are compact convex sets,
• for every n ≥ 1, Fn(σ, ·) is lower semicontinuous and quasiconvex on τ
for every σ ∈Σ,
• for every n≥ 1, Fn(·, τ) is upper semicontinuous and quasiconcave on Σ
for every τ ∈ τ .
Then the normal form game (Σ, τ,F ) has a value v.
A more general version of this proposition can be found in Mertens, Sorin
and Zamir [19] (Part A, Exercise 2, Section 1.f, page 10).
Proof of Theorem 3. Let n ≥ 1 and define the strategic evaluation
Fn by
Fn(σ, τ) = Eσ,τ
(
sup
t≤n
g(xt, it, jt)
)
.
Players remember their own previous actions so by Kuhn’s theorem [8], there
is equivalence between mixed strategies and behavioral strategies. The sets
of mixed strategies are naturally convex. The set of histories of length n
having positive probability is finite and, therefore, the set of pure strategies
is finite. For every n≥ 1, the function Fn(σ, τ) is thus the linear extension of
a finite game. In particular Fn(σ, ·) is lower semicontinuous and quasiconvex
on τ for every σ ∈ Σ and upper semicontinuous and quasiconcave on Σ for
every τ ∈ τ .
Finally, the sequence (Fn)n≥1 is increasing to
F (σ, τ) = Epi,σ,τ
(
sup
t
g(xt, it, jt)
)
.
It follows from Proposition 4 that the game Γ with the sup evaluation
has a value. 
2.2.2. Borel evaluation: limsup evaluation. Several authors have espe-
cially focused on the limsup evaluation and the limsup-mean evaluation.
Definition 5. γ∗ is the limsup evaluation defined by
∀h ∈H∞, γ
∗(h) = limsup
n
g(xn, in, jn).
In (Σ,T , γ∗), the maxmin, the minmax, and the value (called the limsup
value, if it exists) are, respectively, denoted by v∗, v∗ and v∗.
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Definition 6. γ∗m is the limsup-mean evaluation defined by
∀h ∈H∞, γ
∗
m(h) = limsup
n
1
n
n∑
t=1
g(xt, it, jt).
In (Σ,T , γ∗m), the maxmin, the minmax, and the value (called the limsup-
mean value, if it exists) are, respectively, denoted by v∗m, v
∗
m and v
∗
m.
The limsup-mean evaluation is closely related to the limsup evaluation.
Indeed, the analysis of the limsup-mean evaluation of a stochastic game can
be reduced to the study of the limsup evaluation of an auxiliary stochastic
game having as set of states the set of finite histories of the original game.
These evaluations were especially studied by Maitra and Sudderth [10, 11].
In [10], they proved the existence of the limsup value in a stochastic game
with a countable set of states and finite sets of actions when the players
observe the state and the actions played. Next, they extended in [11] this
result to Borel measurable evaluation.
We aim to study potential extensions of their results to repeated game
with signals. In general, a repeated game with signals has no value with
respect to the limsup evaluation as shown in the following three examples.
In each case, we also show that the limsup-mean value does not exist.
Example 1. We consider a recursive game where the players observe
neither the state nor the action played by the other player. We say that the
players are in the dark.
This example, due to Shmaya, is also described in Rosenberg, Solan and
Vieille [25] and can be interpreted as “pick the largest integer.”
The set of states is finite X = {s1, s2, s3,0
∗,1∗,−1∗,2∗,−2∗}, the action
set of player 1 is I = {T,B}, the action set of player 2 is J = {L,R}, and
the transition is given by
L R L R L R
T
B
(
s1 −2
∗
s1 −2
∗
) (
s2 1/2(−1
∗) + 1/2(s3)
1/2(1∗) + 1/2(s1) 0
∗
) (
s3 s3
2∗ 2∗
)
s1 s2 s3
.
The payoff is 0 in states s1,s2, and s3. For example, if the state is s2, player
1 plays T and player 2 plays R then with probability 1/2 the payoff is −1
forever, and with probability 1/2 the next state is s3. States denoted with a
star are absorbing states: if state k∗ is reached, then the state is k∗ for the
remaining of the game and the payoff is k.
Claim. The game which starts in s2 has no limsup value: v
∗ =−1/2<
1/2 = v∗.
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Since the game is recursive, the limsup-mean evaluation and the limsup
evaluation coincide, so there is no limsup-mean value either. It also follows
that the uniform value, defined formally in Section 4, does not exist.
Proof of Claim. The situation is symmetric, so we consider what
player 1 can guarantee.
After player 1 plays B, the game is essentially over from player 1’s view-
point: either absorption occurs or the state moves to s1 where player 1’s
actions are irrelevant. Therefore, the only relevant past history in order to
define a strategy of player 1 corresponds to all his past actions being T . A
strategy of player 1 is thus specified by the probability εn to play B for the
first time at stage n; let ε∗ be the probability that player 1 plays T forever.
Player 2 can reply as follows: fix ε > 0, and consider N such that∑∞
n=N εn ≤ ε. Define the strategy τ which plays L until stage N − 1 and
R at stage N . For any n>N , we have
Es2,σ,τ (g(xn, in, jn))≤ ε
∗(−1/2) +
(
N−1∑
n=1
εn
)
(−1/2) + ε(1/2) ≤−1/2 + ε.
It follows that player 1 cannot guarantee more than −1/2 in the limsup
sense. 
Example 2. We consider a recursive game where one player is more
informed than the other: player 2 observes the state variable and the past
actions played whereas player 1 observes neither the state nor the actions
played.
This structure of information has been studied, for example, by Rosen-
berg, Solan, and Vieille [24], Renault [22] and Gensbittel, Oliu-Barton and
Venel [4]. They proved the existence of the uniform value under the addi-
tional assumption that the more informed player controls the evolution of
the beliefs of the other player on the state variable.
The set of states is finite X = {s2, s3,0
∗,1/2∗,−1∗,2∗}, the action set of
player 1 is I = {T,B}, the action set of player 2 is J = {L,R}, and the
transition is given by
L R L R
T
B
(
s2 1/2(−1
∗) + 1/2(s3)
(−1/2)∗ 0∗
) (
s3 s3
2∗ 2∗
)
s2 s3
.
We focus on the game which starts in s2. Both players can guarantee 0 in
the sup evaluation: player 2 by playing L forever and player 1 by playing
T at the first stage and then B forever. Since the game is recursive, the
limsup-mean evaluation and the limsup evaluation are equals.
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Claim. The game which starts in s2 has no limsup value: v
∗ =−1/2<
−1/6 = v∗.
Proof. The computation of the maxmin with respect to the limsup-
mean evaluation is similar to the computation of Example 1. The reader can
check that player 1 cannot guarantee more than −1/2.
We now prove that the minmax is equal to −1/6. Contrary to Example 1,
player 2 observes the state and actions, nevertheless the game is from his
point of view strategically finished as soon as B or R is played: if B is played
then absorption occurs, if R is played then either absorption occurs or the
state moves to s3 where player 2’s action are irrelevant. Therefore, when
defining the strategy of player 2 at stage n, the only relevant past history
is (s2, T,L)
n and a strategy of player 2 is defined by the probability εn that
he plays R for the first time at stage n and the probability ε∗ that he plays
L forever.
Fix ε > 0, and consider N such that
∑∞
n=N εn ≤ ε. Player 1’s replies
can be reduced to the two following strategies: σ1 which plays T forever
and, σ2 which plays T until stage N − 1 and B at stage N . All the other
strategies are yielding a payoff smaller with an ε-error. The strategy σ1 yields
0ε∗ + (1− ε∗)(−1/2) and the strategy σ2 yields (−1/2)ε
∗ + (1− ε∗)1/2− ε.
The previous payoff functions are almost the payoff of the two-by-two
game where player 1 chooses σ1 or σ2 and player 2 chooses either never to
play R or to play R at least once:(
0 −1/2
−1/2 1/2
)
.
The value of this game is −1/6, giving the result. 
Example 3. In the previous examples, the state is not known to at least
one player.
The following game is a variant of the Big Match introduced by Blackwell
and Ferguson [2]. It is an absorbing game: every state except one are absorb-
ing. Since there is only one state where players can influence the transition
and the payoff, the knowledge of the state is irrelevant. Players can always
consider that the current state is the nonabsorbing state.
We assume that player 2 observes the past actions played whereas player
1 does not (in the original version, both player 1 and player 2 were observing
the state and past actions):
L R
T
B
(
1∗ 0∗
0 1
)
.
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Claim. The game with the sup evaluation has a value vs = 1. The game
with the limsup evaluation and the game with the limsup-mean evaluation
do not have a value: v∗ = v∗m = 0< 1/2 = v
∗
m = v
∗.
Proof. We first prove the existence of the value with respect to the
sup evaluation. Player 1 can guarantee the payoff 1. Let ε > 0, and σ be the
strategy which plays T with probability ε and B with probability 1−ε. This
strategy yields a sup evaluation greater than 1− ε. Since 1 is the maximum
payoff, it is the value: vs = 1.
We now focus on the limsup evaluation and the limsup-mean evaluation.
After player 1 plays T absorption occurs. Therefore, the only relevant
past history in order to define a strategy of player 1 corresponds to all his
past actions being B. Let εn be the probability that player 1 plays T for the
first time at stage n and ε∗ be the probability that player 1 plays B forever.
Player 2 can reply as follows: fix ε > 0, and consider N such that∑∞
n=N εn ≤ ε. Define the strategy τ which plays R until stage N − 1 and L
at stage N . For any n >N , we have
Es,σ,τ (g(xn, in, jn))≤ ε
∗0 +
(
N−1∑
n=1
εn
)
0 + ε(1)≤ ε.
Let us compute what player 2 can guarantee with respect to the lim-
sup evaluation. The computation is similar for the limsup-mean evaluation.
First, player 2 can guarantee 1/2 by playing the following mixed strategy:
with probability 1/2, play L at every stage and with probability 1/2, play
R at every stage.
We now prove that it is the best payoff that player 2 can achieve. Fix
a strategy τ for player 2 and consider the induced law P on the set H∞ =
{L,R}∞ of infinite sequences of L and R induced by τ when player 1 plays
B at every stage. Denote by βn the probability that player 2 plays L at stage
n. If there exists a stage N such that βN ≥ 1/2, then playing B until N − 1
and T at stage N yields a payoff greater than 1/2 to player 1. If for every
n, βn ≤ 1/2, then the stage payoff is in expectation greater than 1/2 when
player 1 plays B. Therefore, the expected limsup payoff is greater than 1/2.

3. Symmetric repeated game with Borel evaluation. Contrary to the
sup evaluation, in general the existence of the value for a given evaluation
depends on the signaling structure. In Section 2, we analyzed three games
without limsup-mean value. In this section, we prove that if the signaling
structure is symmetric as defined next, the value always exists in every Borel
evaluation.
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3.1. Model and results.
Definition 7. A symmetric signaling repeated game form is a repeated
game form with signals Γ = (X,I,J,C,D,π, q) such that there exists a set
S with C =D = I × J × S satisfying
∀(x, i, j) ∈X × I × J,
∑
s,x′
q(x, i, j)(x′, (i, j, s), (i, j, s)) = 1
and the initial distribution π is also symmetric: π(x, c, d)> 0 implies c= d.
Intuitively, at each stage of a symmetric signaling repeated game form,
the players observe both actions played and a public signal s. It will be
convenient to write such a game form as a tuple Γ = (X,I,J,S,π, q) and
since for such a game: q(x, i, j)(x′, (i′, j′, s′), (i′′, j′′, s′′))> 0 only if i= i′ = i′′
and j = j′ = j′′ and s′ = s′′, without loss of generality, we can and will
write q(x, i, j)(x′, s) as a shorthand for q(x, i, j)(x′, (i, j, s), (i, j, s)). With this
notation q(x, i, j) and the initial distribution π are elements of ∆f (X × S).
The set of observed plays is then V∞ = (S × I × J)
∞.
Theorem 8. Let Γ be a symmetric signaling repeated game form. For
every Borel evaluation f , the game Γ has a value.
Corollary 9. A symmetric signaling repeated game (Γ, g) has a limsup
value and a limsup-mean value.
3.2. Proof of Theorem 8. Let us first give an outline of the proof. Given
a symmetric signaling repeated game form Γ and a Borel evaluation f , we
construct an auxiliary standard stochastic game Γ̂ (where the players observe
the state and the actions) and a Borel evaluation f̂ on the corresponding
set of plays. We use the existence of the value in the game Γ̂ with respect to
the evaluation f̂ to deduce the existence of the value in the original game.
The difficult point is the definition of the evaluation f̂ . The key idea is
to define a conditional probability with respect to the σ-algebra of observed
plays. For a given probability on plays, the existence of such conditional
probability is easy since the sets involved are Polish. In our case, the diffi-
culty comes from the necessity to have the same conditional probability for
any of the probability distributions that could be generated by the strategies
of the players (Sections 3.3.2–3.3.4). (As remarked by a referee the observed
plays generate in fact a sufficient statistic for the plays with respect to all
these distributions.) The definition of the conditional probability is achieved
in three steps: we first define the conditional probability of a finite history
with respect to a finite observed history, then we use a martingale result
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to define the conditional probability of a finite history with respect to an
observed play and finally we rely on Kolmogorov extension theorem to con-
struct a conditional probability on plays. Finally, we introduce the function
f̂ on the observed plays as the integral of f with respect to this conditional
probability.
After introducing few notations we prove the existence of the value by
defining the game Γ̂, assuming the existence of the function f̂ (Lemma 10).
The next three sections will be dedicated to the construction of the condi-
tional probability, then to the definition and properties of the function f̂ for
any Borelian payoff function f .
Let Γ be a symmetric signaling repeated game form, we do not assume
the Borel evaluation to be given.
3.3. Notation. Let Hn = (X×S× I×J)
n−1×X×S, H =
⋃
n≥1Hn, the
set of histories and H∞ = (X × S × I × J)
∞, the set of plays.
For all h ∈H∞, define h|n ∈Hn as the projection of h on the n first stages.
For all hn ∈Hn, denote by h
+
n the cylinder generated by hn in H∞: h
+
n =
{h ∈ H∞, h|n = hn} and by Hn the corresponding σ-algebra. H∞ denotes
the σ-algebra generated by
⋃
nHn.
Let Vn = (S× I×J)
n−1×S =H1n =H
2
n, V =
⋃
n≥1Vn and V∞ = (S× I×
J)∞.
For all v ∈ V∞, define v|n ∈ Vn as the projection of v on the n first stages.
For all vn ∈ Vn, denote by v
+
n the cylinder generated by vn in V∞: v
+
n =
{v ∈ V∞, v|n = vn} and by Vn the corresponding σ-algebra. V∞ is the σ-
algebra generated by
⋃
n Vn.
We denote by Θ the application from H∞ to V∞ which forgets all the
states: more precisely, Θ(x1, s1, i1, j1, . . . , xn, sn, in, jn, . . .) = (s1, i1, j1, . . . ,
sn, in, jn, . . .). We use the same notation for the corresponding application
defined from H to V .
We denote by V∗n (resp., V
∗
∞) the image of Vn (resp., V∞) by Θ
−1 which
are sub σ-algebras of Hn (resp., H∞). Explicitly, for vn ∈ Vn, v
∗
n denotes the
cylinder generated by vn in H∞: v
∗
n = {h ∈H∞,Θ(h)|n = vn}, V
∗
n are the
corresponding σ-algebras and V∗∞ the σ-algebra generated by their union.
Any Vn (resp., V∞)-measurable function ℓ on V∞ induces a V
∗
n (resp.,
V∗∞)-measurable function ℓ ◦Θ on H∞.
Define α from H to [0,1] where for hn = (x1, s1, i1, j1, . . . , xn, sn):
α(hn) = π(x1, s1)
n−1∏
t=1
q(xt, it, jt)(xt+1, st+1)
and β from V to [0,1] where for vn = (s1, i1, j1, . . . , sn):
β(vn) =
∑
hn∈Hn;Θ(hn)=vn
α(hn).
ON VALUES OF REPEATED GAMES WITH SIGNALS 13
Let Hn = {hn ∈Hn; α(hn) > 0} and V n = Θ(Hn) and recall that these
sets are finite. We introduce now the set of plays and observed plays that
can occur during the game as H∞ =
⋂
nH
+
n and V∞ = Θ(H∞) =
⋂
n V n.
Remark that both are measurable subsets of H∞ and V∞, respectively.
For every pair of strategies (σ, τ), we denote by Pσ,τ the probability distri-
bution induced over the set of plays (H∞,H∞) and by Qσ,τ the probability
distribution over the set of observed plays (V∞,V∞). Thus, Qσ,τ is the image
of Pσ,τ under Θ. Note that supp(Pσ,τ ) ⊂H∞. We denote, respectively, by
EPσ,τ and EQσ,τ the corresponding expectations.
It turns out that for technical reasons it is much more convenient to
work with the space V∞ rather than with V∞ (and with H∞ rather than
with H∞). And then, abusing slightly the notation, V∞ and Vn will tacitly
denote the restrictions to V∞ of the corresponding σ-algebras defined on
V∞. On rare occasions this can lead to a confusion and then we will write,
for example, Vn to denote the σ-algebra {U ∩V∞|U ∈ Vn} the restriction of
Vn to V∞.
3.3.1. Definition of an equivalent game. Let us define an auxiliary stochas-
tic game Γ̂. The sets of actions I and J are the same as in Γ. The set of
states is V =
⋃
n≥1Vn and the transition q̂ from V × I × J to ∆(V ) is given
by
∀vn ∈ Vn,∀i ∈ I,∀j ∈ J, q̂(vn, i, j) =
∑
s∈S
ψ(vn, i, j, s)δvn,i,j,s,
where ψ(vn, i, j, s) =
β(vn,i,j,s)
β(vn)
.
Note that if vn ∈ Vn then the support of q̂(vn, i, j) is included in Vn+1,
in particular is finite. Moreover, if q̂(vn, i, j)(vn+1) > 0 then vn+1|n = vn.
The initial distribution of Γ̂ is the marginal distribution πS of π on S, if
s ∈ S = V1, then π
S(s) =
∑
x∈X π(x, s) and π
S(v) = 0 for v ∈ V \ V1.
Let us note that the original game Γ and the auxiliary game Γ̂ have the
same sets of strategies. Indeed a behavioral strategy in Γ is a mapping from
V to probability distributions over actions. Thus, each behavioral strategy
in Γ is a stationary strategy in Γ̂. On the other hand however, each state
of Γ̂ “contains” all previously visited states and all played actions; thus,
for all useful purposes, in Γ̂ behavioral strategies and stationary strategies
coincide.
Now suppose that (v1, i1, j1, v2, i2, j2, . . .) is a play in Γ̂. Then vn+1|n = vn
for all n and there exists v ∈ V∞ such that v|n = vn for all n. Thus, defining
a payoff on infinite histories in Γ̂ amounts to defining a payoff on V∞.
Lemma 10. Given a Borel function f on H∞, there exists a Borel func-
tion f̂ on V∞ such that
EPσ,τ (f) = EQσ,τ (f̂).(1)
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Therefore, playing in Γ with strategies (σ, τ) and payoff f is the same as
playing in Γ̂ with the same strategies and payoff f̂ .
By Martin [16] or Maitra and Sudderth [14], the stochastic game Γ̂ with
payoff f̂ has a value implying that Γ with payoff f has the same value, which
completes the proof of Theorem 8.
The three next sections are dedicated to the proof of Lemma 10.
3.3.2. Regular conditional probability of finite time events with respect to
finite observed histories. For m≥ n≥ 1, we define Φn,m from H∞×V∞ to
[0,1] by
Φn,m(h, v) =

∑
h′,h′|n=h|n,Θ(h′|m)=v|m
α(h′|m)
β(v|m)
, if Θ(h|n) = v|n,
0, otherwise.
This corresponds to the joint probability of the players on the realization of
the history h up to stage n, given the observed history v up to stage m.
Since Φn,m(h, v) depends only on h|n and v|m, we can see Φn,m as a
function defined on Hn×V m and note that its support is included in Hn×
V m. On the other hand, since each set U ∈Hn is a finite union of cylinders
h+n for hn ∈ Hn such that h
+
n ⊂ U , Φn,m can be seen as a mapping from
Hn×V∞ into [0,1], where Φn,m(U,v) =
∑
hn,h
+
n⊆U
Φn,m(hn, v). Bearing this
last observation in mind, we have the following.
Lemma 11. For every m ≥ n ≥ 1, Φn,m is a probability kernel from
(V∞,Vm) to (H∞,Hn).
Proof. Since
∑
hn∈Hn
Φn,m(hn, v) = 1 for v ∈ V∞, Φn,m(·, v) defines a
probability on Hn. Moreover, for any U ∈ Hn, Φn,m(U,v) is a function of
the m first components of v hence is Vm-measurable. 
Lemma 12. Let m≥ n≥ 1 and (σ, τ) be a pair of strategies. Then, for
every vm ∈ V m such that Qσ,τ (v
+
m) = Pσ,τ (v
∗
m)> 0, and every hn ∈Hn:
Pσ,τ (h
+
n |v
∗
m) = Φn,m(hn, vm).
Proof. Let vm = (s1, i1, j1, . . . , sm) and hn ∈Hn,
Pσ,τ (h
+
n |v
∗
m)
=
Pσ,τ (h
+
n ∩ v
∗
m)
Pσ,τ (v∗m)
=

∑
h′,h′|n=hn,θ(h′|m)=vm
α(h′|m)W (i1, j1, . . . , jm−1)
β(vm)W (i1, j1, . . . , jm−1)
, if Θ(hn) = vm|n,
0, otherwise,
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where W (i1, j1, . . . , jm−1) =
∏
t≤m−1 σ(vm|t)(it)τ(vm|t)(jt). After simplifica-
tion, we recognize on the right the definition of Φn,m(vm, hn). 
We deduce the following lemma.
Lemma 13. For every pair of strategies (σ, τ), eachW ∈ Vm and U ∈Hn
we have
Pσ,τ (U ∩Θ
−1(W )) =
∫
W
Φn,m(U,v)Qσ,τ (dv).(2)
Proof. Clearly, it suffices to prove (2) for cylinders U = h+n andW = v
+
m
with β(vm)> 0.
We have ∫
v+m
Φn,m(hn, v)Qσ,τ (dv) = Φn,m(hn, vm)Qσ,τ (v
+
m)
= Pσ,τ (h
+
n |v
∗
m)Qσ,τ (v
+
m)
= Pσ,τ (h
+
n |v
∗
m)Pσ,τ (v
∗
m)
= Pσ,τ (h
+
n ∩ v
∗
m). 
Note that (2) can be equivalently written as: for every pair of strategies
(σ, τ), each W ∗ ∈ V
∗
m and U ∈Hn
Pσ,τ (U ∩W
∗) =
∫
W ∗
Φn,m(U,Θ(h))Pσ,τ (dh).(3)
3.3.3. Regular conditional probability of finite time events with respect
to infinite observed histories. In this paragraph, we prove that instead of
defining one application Φn,m for every pair (m,n) such that m≥ n≥ 1, one
can define a unique probability kernel Φn from (Ωn,V∞) to (H∞,Hn), with
Qσ,τ (Ωn) = 1, for all (σ, τ), such that the extension of Lemma 13 holds.
For h ∈H∞, let
Ωh = {v ∈ V∞|Φn,m(h, v) converges as m ↑∞}.
The domain Ωh is measurable (see Kallenberg [6], page 6, e.g.). Recall that
Ωh depends only on h|n and write also Ωh|n for Ωh. Let then
Ωn =
⋂
hn∈Hn
Ωhn .
We define Φn :H∞× V∞→ [0,1] by Φn = limm→∞Φn,m on H∞×Ωn and 0
otherwise. As a limit of a sequence of measurable mappings Φn is measurable
(see Kallenberg [6], page 6, e.g.).
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Lemma 14. (i) For each pair of strategies (σ, τ), Qσ,τ (Ωn) = 1.
(ii) For each v ∈Ωn,
∑
hn∈Hn
Φn(hn, v) = 1.
(iii) For each U ∈Hn the mapping v 7→Φn(U,v) is a measurable mapping
from (V∞,V∞) to R.
(iv) For each pair of strategies (σ, τ), for each U ∈Hn and each W ∈ V∞
Pσ,τ (U ∩Θ
−1(W )) =
∫
W
Φn(U,v)Qσ,τ (dv).(4)
Proof. (i) For hn ∈ Hn and each pair of strategies σ, τ we define on
H∞ a sequence of random variables Zhn,m, m≥ n,
Zhn,m = Pσ,τ [h
+
n |V
∗
m].
As a conditional expectation of a bounded random variable with respect
to an increasing sequence of σ-algebras, Zhn,m is a martingale (with respect
to Pσ,τ ), hence converges Pσ,τ -almost surely and in L
1 to the random variable
Zhn = Pσ,τ [h
+
n |V
∗
∞].
For m≥ n, we define the mappings ψn,m[hn] :H∞→ [0,1],
ψn,m[hn](h) = Φn,m(hn,Θ(h)).
Let us show that for each hn ∈ Hn, ψm,n[hn] is a version of the condi-
tional expectation EPσ,τ [1hn |V
∗
m] = Pσ,τ [h
+
n |V
∗
m]. First note that ψn,m[hn] is
(H∞,V
∗
m) measurable. Lemma 12 implies that, for h ∈ supp(Pσ,τ ) ⊂ H∞,
ψn,m[hn](h) = Φn,m(hn,Θ(h)) = Pσ,τ (h
+
n |v|
∗
m) = Pσ,τ (h
+
n |V
∗
m)(h), where v =
Θ(h). Hence, the claim.
Since ψn,m[hn] is a version of Pσ,τ (h
+
n |V
∗
m), its limit ψn[hn] exists and is
a version of Pσ,τ (h
+
n |V
∗
∞), Pσ,τ -almost surely. In particular,
(C1) the set Θ−1(Ωhn) = {h ∈H∞|limmψn,m[hn](h) exists} is V
∗
∞ measur-
able and has Pσ,τ -measure 1,
(C2) for each W ∗ ∈ V∗∞,
∫
W ∗
ψn[hn](h)Pσ,τ (dh) =
∫
W ∗
E[1h+n |V
∗
∞]Pσ,τ =
Pσ,τ (W
∗ ∩ h+n ).
Note that (C1) implies that Qσ,τ (Ωn) = 1.
(ii) If v ∈ Ωn then, for all hn ∈Hn, Φn,m(hn, v) converges to Φn(hn, v).
But, by Lemma 11,
∑
hn∈Hn
Φn,m(hn, v) = 1. The sum being with finitely
many nonzero terms one has
∑
hn∈Hn
Φn(hn, v) = 1.
(iii) Was proved before the lemma.
(iv) Since
∫
W
Φn(hn, v)Qσ,τ (dv) =
∫
Θ−1(W )ψn[hn](h)Pσ,τ (dh) forW ∈ V∞,
using (C2) we get
Pσ,τ (h
+
n ∩Θ
−1(W )) =
∫
W
Φn(hn, v)Qσ,τ (dv)
for U ∈ V∞. 
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3.3.4. Regular conditional probability of infinite time events with respect
to infinite observed histories. In this section, using Kolmogorov extension
theorem we construct from the sequence Φn of probability kernels from
(Ωn,V∞) to (H∞,Hn), one probability kernel Φ from (Ω∞,V∞) to (H∞,Hn),
with Qσ,τ (Ω∞) = 1, for all (σ, τ).
Lemma 15. There exists a measurable subset Ω∞ of V∞ such that, for
all strategies σ, τ :
• Qσ,τ (Ω∞) = 1 and
• there exists a probability kernel Φ from (Ω∞,V∞) to (H∞,H∞) such that
for each W ∈ V∞ and U ∈H∞
Pσ,τ (U ∩Θ
−1(W )) =
∫
W
Φ(U,v)Qσ,τ (dv).(5)
Before proceeding to the proof, some remarks are in order.
A probability kernel having the property given above is called a regular
conditional probability.
For given strategies σ and τ , the existence of a transition kernel κα,β from
(V∞,V∞) to (H∞,H∞) such that for each U ∈ V∞ and A ∈H∞
Pσ,τ (A∩Θ
−1(U)) =
∫
U
κσ,τ (A,v)Qσ,τ (dv)
is well known provided that V∞ is a Polish space and V∞ is the Borel σ-
algebra. In the current framework it is easy to introduce an appropriate
metric on V∞ such that this condition is satisfied thus the existence of κσ,τ
is immediately assured.
The difficulty in our case comes from the fact that we look for a regular
conditional probability which is common for all probabilities Pσ,τ , where
(σ, τ) range over all strategies of both players.
Proof of Lemma 15. We follow the notation of the proof of Lemma 14
and define Ω∞ =
⋂
n≥1Ωn. Let (σ, τ) be a couple of strategies. For every
n≥ 1, Qσ,τ (Ωn) = 1, hence Qσ,τ (Ω∞) = 1. By Lemma 14(ii), given v ∈ Ω∞,
the sequence {Φn(·, v)}n≥1 of probabilities on {(H∞,Hn)}n≥1 is well de-
fined. Let us show that this sequence satisfies the condition of Kolmogorov’s
extension theorem.
In fact Φn,m(·, v) is defined on the power set of Hn by
∀A⊂Hn, Φn,m(A,v) =
∑
hn∈A
Φn,m(hn, v).
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Thus, for every hn ∈Hn, we have
Φn,m(hn, v) =
Pσ,τ (v|
∗
m ∩ h
+
n )
Pσ,τ (v|∗m)
=
Pσ,τ (v|
∗
m ∩ (hn × I × J ×X × S)
+)
Pσ,τ (v|∗m)
= Φn+1,m(hn × (I × J ×X × S), v).
Taking the limit, we obtain the same equality for Φn and Φn+1 hence the
compatibility condition. By the Kolmogorov extension theorem for each v ∈
Ω, there exists a measure Φ(·, v) on (H∞,H∞) such that
Φ(h+n , v) = Φn(h
+
n , v)
for each n and each hn ∈Hn.
Let us prove that, for each U ∈ H∞, the mapping v 7→ Φ(U,v) is V∞-
measurable on Ω∞.
Let C be the class of sets A ∈H∞ such that Φ(A, ·) has this property. By
Lemma 14, C contains the π-system consisting of cylinders generating H∞.
To show that H∞ ⊆ C it suffices to show that C is a λ-system. Let Ai be an
increasing sequence of sets belonging to C. Since, for each v ∈ V∞, Φ(·, v) is a
measure, we have Φ(
⋃
nAn, v) = supnΦ(An, v). However, v 7→ supnΦ(An, v)
is measurable as a supremum of measurable mappings v 7→ Φ(An, v). Let
A⊃B be two sets belonging to C. Then Φ(A \B,v) +Φ(B,v) = Φ(A,v) by
additivity of measure and v 7→Φ(A\B,v) = Φ(A,v)−Φ(B,v) is measurable
as a difference of measurable mappings.
To prove (5), take a measurable subset W of V∞ and consider the set
function
H∞ ∋U 7→
∫
W
Φ(U,dv)Qσ,τ (dv).
Since Φ(·, v) is nonnegative this set function is a measure on (H∞,H∞).
However, by Lemma (14), this mapping is equal to U 7→ Pσ,τ (U ∩Θ
−1(W ))
for U belonging to the π-system of cylinders generating H∞. But two mea-
sures equal on a generating π-system are equal, which terminates the proof
of (5). 
A standard property of probability kernels and the fact that Ω∞ has
measure 1 imply:
Corollary 16. Let f :H∞→ [0,1] be H∞-measurable mapping. Then
the mapping f̂ : V∞→ [0,1] defined by
f̂(v) =

∫
H∞
f(h)Φ(dh, v), if v ∈Ω∞,
0, otherwise,
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is V∞-measurable and
EPσ,τ [f ] = EQσ,τ [f̂ ] ∀σ, τ.
Remark 17. In the previous proof, we proceeded through a reduction
from a symmetric repeated game to a stochastic game in order to apply
Martin’s existence result. The same procedure can be applied for N -player
repeated games. Let us consider a N -player symmetric signaling repeated
game. One defines a conditional probability and therefore associates to
all Borel payoffs f i on plays, i ∈ N an associated Borel evaluation f̂ i on
the space of observed plays, therefore, reducing the problem to a N -player
stochastic game with Borelian payoffs.
For example, Mertens [17] showed the existence of pure ε-Nash equilib-
rium in N -person stochastic games with Borel payoff functions where at
each stage at most one of the players is playing. Using the previous reduc-
tion, one can deduce the existence of pure ε-Nash equilibrium in N -person
symmetric repeated games with Borel payoff functions where at each stage
at most one of the players is playing.
4. Uniform value in recursive games with nonnegative payoffs. In Sec-
tion 2 and Section 3, we focused on Borel evaluations. In this last section,
we focus on the family of mean average of the n first stage rewards and the
corresponding uniform value.
Definition 18. For each n ≥ 1, the mean expected payoff induced by
(σ, τ) during the first n stages is
γn(σ, τ) = Eσ,τ
(
1
n
n∑
t=1
g(xt, it, jt)
)
.
Definition 19. Let v be a real number.
A strategy σ∗ of player 1 guarantees v in the uniform sense in (Γ, g) if
for all η > 0 there exists n0 ≥ 1 such that
∀n≥ n0,∀τ ∈ T , γn(σ
∗, τ)≥ v− η.(6)
Player 1 can guarantee v in the uniform sense in (Γ, g) if for all ε > 0 there
exists a strategy σ∗ ∈Σ which guarantees v− ε in the uniform sense.
A symmetric notion holds for player 2.
Definition 20. The uniform maxmin, denoted by v∞, is the supremum
of all the payoff that player 1 can guarantee in the uniform sense. A uniform
minmax denoted by v∞ is defined in a dual way.
If both players can guarantee v in the uniform sense, then v is the uniform
value of the game (Γ, g) and denoted by v∞.
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Many existence results have been proven in the literature concerning the
uniform value and uniform maxmin and minmax; see, for example, Mertens,
Sorin and Zamir [19] or Sorin [28]. Mertens and Neyman [18] proved that
in a stochastic game with a finite state space and finite actions spaces,
where the players observe past payoffs and the state, the uniform value
exists. Moreover, the uniform value is equal to the limsup-mean value and
for every ε > 0 there exists a strategy which guarantees v∞ − ε both in the
limsup-mean sense and in the uniform sense.
In general, the uniform value does not exist (either in games with incom-
plete information on both sides or in stochastic games with signals on the
actions) and in particular its existence depends upon the signaling structure.
Remark 21. For n≥ 1, the n-stage game (Γn, g) is the zero-sum game
with normal form (Σ,T , γn) and value vn. It is interesting to note that in
the special case of symmetric signaling repeated games with a finite set of
states and finite set of signals, a uniform value may not exist, since even
the sequence of values vn may not converge (Ziliotto [30]), but there exists
a value for any Borel evaluation by Theorem 8.
We focus now on the specific case of recursive games with nonnegative
payoff defined as follows.
Definition 22. Recall that a state is absorbing if the probability to
stay in this state is 1 for all actions and the payoff is also independent of
the actions played. A repeated game is recursive if the payoff is equal to 0
outside the absorbing states. If all absorbing payoffs are nonnegative, the
game is recursive and nonnegative.
Solan and Vieille [27] have shown the existence of a uniform value in
nonnegative recursive games where the players observe the state and past
actions played. We show that the result is true without assumption on the
signals to the players.
In a recursive game, the limsup-mean evaluation and the limsup evalua-
tion coincide. If the recursive game has nonnegative payoffs, the sup evalu-
ation, the limsup evaluation and the limsup-mean evaluation both coincide.
So, Theorem 3 implies the existence of the value with respect to these eval-
uations. Using a similar proof, we obtain the stronger theorem.
Theorem 23. A recursive game with nonnegative payoffs has a uniform
value v∞, equal to the sup value and the limsup value. Moreover, there exists
a strategy of player 2 that guarantees v∞.
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The proof of the existence of the uniform value is similar to the proof of
Proposition 4 while using a specific sequence of strategic evaluations.
Proof of Theorem 23. The sequence of stage payoffs is nondecreasing
on each history: 0 until absorption occurs and then constant, equal to some
nonnegative real number. In particular, the payoff converges and the limsup
can be replaced by a limit.
Let σ be a strategy of player 1 and τ be a strategy of player 2, then
γn(σ, τ) is nondecreasing in n. This implies that the corresponding sequence
of values (vn)n∈N is nondecreasing in n. Denote v = supn vn and let us show
that v is the uniform value.
Fix ε > 0, consider N such that vN ≥ v− ε and σ
∗ a strategy of player 1
which is optimal in ΓN . We have for each τ and, for every n≥N ,
γn(σ
∗, τ)≥ γN (σ
∗, τ)≥ vN ≥ v− ε.
Hence, the strategy σ∗ guarantees v − ε in the uniform sense. This is true
for every positive ε, thus player 1 guarantees v in the uniform sense.
Using the monotone convergence theorem, we also have
γ∗(σ∗, τ) = Eσ∗,τ
(
lim
n
1
n
n∑
t=1
g(xt, it, jt)
)
= lim
n
Eσ∗,τ
(
1
n
n∑
t=1
g(xt, it, jt)
)
≥ v− ε.
We now show that player 2 can also guarantee v in the uniform sense.
Consider for every n, the set
Kn = {τ,∀σ,γn(σ, τ)≤ v}.
Kn is nonempty because it contains an optimal strategy for player 2 in
Γn (since vn ≤ v). The set of strategies of player 2 is compact, hence by
continuity of the n-stage payoff γn, Kn is itself compact. γn ≤ γn+1 implies
Kn+1 ⊂Kn hence
⋂
nKn 6= ∅: there exists τ
∗ such that for every strategy
of player 1, σ and for every positive integer n, γn(σ, τ)≤ v. It follows that
both players can guarantee v, thus v is the uniform value.
By the monotone convergence theorem, we also have
γ∗(σ, τ∗) = Eσ,τ∗
(
lim
n
1
n
n∑
t=1
g(xt, it, jt)
)
= lim
n
Eσ,τ∗
(
1
n
n∑
t=1
g(xt, it, jt)
)
≤ v.
Hence, v is the sup and limsup value. 
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Remark 24. The fact that the sequence of n-stage values (vn)n≥1 is
nondecreasing is not enough to ensure the existence of the uniform value.
For example, consider the Big Match [2] with no signals: vn = 1/2 for each
n, but there is no uniform value.
Remark 25. The theorem states the existence of a 0-optimal strategy
for player 2 but player 1 may only have ε-optimal strategies. For example, in
the following MDP, there are two absorbing states, two nonabsorbing states
with payoff 0 and two actions Top and Bottom :(
1/2(s1) + 1/2(s2)
0∗
) (
s2
1∗
)
.
s1 s2
The starting state is s1 and player 1 observes nothing. A good strategy
is to play Top for a long time and then Bottom. While playing Bottom,
the process absorbs and with a strictly positive probability the absorption
occurs in state s1 with absorbing payoff 0. So player 1 has no strategy which
guarantees the uniform value of 1.
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